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CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968 REVISITED
CHARLES M. LAMB
I.

t

INTRODUCTION

A

CCORDING TO STATISTICS compiled by the Bureau of
the Census for 1978, a majority of the black households in the
United States do not own their own homes,' while more than twothirds of white households do.2 Of the black households which
rent their homes, almost a third report signs of rats or mice."
Twenty percent of the black households which rent have open
cracks or holes in their interior walls 4 and have abandoned buildings on their streets. 5 Almost seven percent of all black households-both renters and homeowners-lack plumbing facilities.6
More than eight percent of black households which rent have holes

t Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at
Buffalo. B.S., Middle Tennessee State University, 1967; M.A., 1970, Ph.D.,
1974, University of Alabama.
The author would like to express his appreciation to the Baldy Center for
Law and Social Policy of the State University of New York at Buffalo for its
financial support relating to this article, to Timothy Mustaine for his research
assistance, and to Q. Whitfield Ayers, Charles S. Bullock, and Stephen L.
Wasby for their comments.
1. BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL

HOUSING

SURVEY: 1978 Part B, at 12 (1981). The exact percentage is 44%. Id.
2. Id. Sixty-eight percent of all white households own their own homes.
Id.
3. Id. at 12. This percentage is 32.69%. Id. On the other hand, only
13% of white households which rent their homes reported signs of rats or
mice. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 14. The exact percentage is 20.64%. Id. On the other hand,
only 9.59% of white households which rent report similar cracks or holes. Id.
at 5.
5. Id. at 12. The exact percentage is 20.38%. Id. Only 4.49% of white
households which rent report abandoned buildings on their streets. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 11. The exact percentage is 6.99%. Id. The corresponding
percentage for all white households is 1.8%. Id. at 2.

(1115)
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in their floors, 7 and more than five percent have exposed wiring
in their homes 8
Such housing conditions should not be countenanced in a
democratic society that professes to be responsive to the most fundamental needs of its people. Yet they persist primarily because of
housing discrimination and segregation. 9 The United States Congress and the federal courts have sought to fight discrimination and
segregation in the housing market through Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII), commonly referred to as the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.10 This article will analyze that Act. Part II
of the article examines the legislative history of the Fair Housing
Act and, contrary to conventional thinking, argues that the Act
would not have been forthcoming without the initiative and leadership of President Lyndon B. Johnson." Part III critically analyzes
the provisions of Title VIII and makes recommendations for
change.' 2 Part IV assesses how the federal courts have interpreted

two of the most important provisions of Title VIII, those relating
to blockbusting and racial steering.1 3
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VIII: PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL INDIFFERENCE

Since the late 1950's, the United States Congress has had too
few liberal critics of its role in promoting civil rights.' 4 For ex7. Id. at 14. The exact figure is 8.53%. Id. The corresponding percentage for white households which rent is 2.78%. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 13. The exact figure is 5.39%. Id. On the other hand, 3.84%
of white households which rent report exposed wiring. Id. at 4.
9. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
MEASURING

RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

IN

AMERICAN

HOUSING

MARKETS:

THE

HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING
MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY]. See also Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, Barriers to
Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS 97

(1979); Lamb, Housing Discrimination and Segregation in America: Problematical Dimensions and the Federal Legal Response, 30 CATH. U.L. REV.

363 (1981).
10. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1976)).
11. See notes 14-73 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 74-169 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 172-295 and accompanying text infra.
14. For examples of the literature praising civil rights initiatives by Congress, see C. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS 231-35 (1973); Brody, Congress, the President, and

Federal Equal Employment Policymaking: A Problem in Separation of Powers,
60 B.U.L. REV. 239 (1980); Mitchell, The Warren Court and Congress: A
Civil Rights Partnership,48 NEB. L. REV. 91 (1968); Comment, The Federal
Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE
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ample, Gary Orfield, a well-known authority on both civil rights
and Congress, 15 acknowledges that Congress was a "graveyard for
civil rights during the eight decades between 1875 and 1957." 16
However, he maintains that the congressional initiative in passing
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 17 and 1964 18 was instrumental to
those enactments, and that Congress even went significantly beyond
President John F. Kennedy's proposals to strengthen the 1964 Act."
Some commentators disagree with Orfield's view that Congress
has exercised a leadership role in promoting civil rights.2 0 More
troubling, however, is Orfield's argument that Congress has been a
proponent of laws to guarantee fair housing.21 For example, Orfield
asserts that, two years prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, "there was a majority in each house in favor of fair-housing
legislation" even though open housing was "an idea still considered
suspect by much of the public." 22 According to Orfield:
L.J. 733, 748-55 [hereinafter cited as The Federal Fair Housing Requirements].
For a discussion of the breadth of congressional powers in civil rights, see
generally Comment, Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Limits of Congressional
Power to Use Racial Classifications, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 617 (1979).
15. Mr. Orfield's works include MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND
NATIONAL POLICY (1979) [hereinafter cited as MUST WE Bus?]; FEDERAL
AGENCIES

AND URBAN SEGREGATION: STEPS TOWARID COORDINATED
RACIAL SEGREGATION: Two POLICY VIEWS 6 (Ford Foundation ed.

ACTION

IN

1979) [here-

inafter cited
POWER:

as FEDERAL AGENCIES AND URBAN SEGREGATION]; CONGRESSIONAL
CONGRESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1975) [hereinafter cited as CONGRES-

SIONAL POWER];
AND THE

THE RECONSTRUCTION

OF SOUTHERN

EDUCATION:

THE SCHOOLS

1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1969); Research, Politics and the Antibusing
Debate, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1978); How to Make Desegregation
Work: The Adaption of Schools to their Newly-Integrated Student Bodies, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 314 (1975); Congress, the President, and Antibusing
Legislation, 1966-1974, 4 J.L. & EDuc. 81 (1975); Federal Policy, Local Power,
and Metropolitan Segregation, 89 POL. Sx. Q. 777 (1974).
16. CONGRESSIONAL POWER, supra note 15, at 63.
17. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 295 (1976), 28
id. §§ 1343, 1861, 42 id. §§ 1971, 1975a-e, 1995).
18. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a), (c),
(f)-(h), 1975a-d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976)).
19. CONGRESSIONAL POWER,

supra note 15, at 64-65.

20. See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 829-31 (1968). Contrary to
Orfield, Rodgers and Bullock argue that instead of taking the initiative,
Congress usually passes civil rights legislation only in a crisis situation. See

H.

RODGERS

& C.

BULLOCK, LAW AND

THEIR CONSEQUENCES

212-13 (1972).

SOCIAL CHANGE:

CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND

Regarding congressional failures to enact

legislation prohibiting discrimination against women, see Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal
Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1977).
21. For the views of other critics of Orfield's views, see generally Mitchell,
supra note 14; The Federal Fair Housing Requirements, supra note 14.

22.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER,

note 9, at 369-72.

supra note 15, at 67 & 68. But cf. Lamb, supra
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Congress took the initiative on civil rights in 1968an initiative it would hold throughout the next several
Against the advice of ... President [Johnson,]
years ....
the Justice Department, and virtually all knowledgeable
observers, a small group of Senate civil rights leaders began to fight to enact a broad federal fair-housing law as an
amendment to the House [1968 Civil Rights] bill. With
the support of the Democratic leadership and the active
work of young Republican progressives, civil rights forces
finally won an arduous battle that involved no less than
four successive cloture votes. The President played no
significant role in the process .... 23
This portrayal of congressional leadership in fair housing is
misleading. To be sure, many liberal congressmen from both
political parties have periodically voiced substantial concern over
housing discrimination. Nonetheless, Congress, as an institution,
is a highly unlikely body to provide the type of leadership and
direction necessary to overcome discriminatory housing practices
and residential segregation. Congress lacks the centralized nature
of the executive branch. Its diverse membership prevents it from
speaking with one voice on any issue, and its size slows the decisionmaking process considerably. The potential for congressional
leadership in the area of housing desegregation is further undermined by the susceptibility of representatives and senators to pressures from constituents and special interest groups opposed to open
housing. Such pressures resulted in the congressional failure to
pass the Fair Housing Amendment Acts of 1979 and 1980,24 and in
the patent inadequacies in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
23. CONGRESSIONAL POWER, supra note 15, at 69-70. In another of his
works, Orfield similarly singled out Congress' role in the Fair Housing Act
breakthrough, again neglecting to give any credit to President Johnson. See
MusT WE Bus?, supra note 15, at 85.
24. The Fair Housing Amendments Acts of 1979 and 1980 would have
substantially increased the fair housing enforcement powers of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, would have considerably enlarged the
circumstances in which the Department of Justice could initiate litigation
under Title VIII, and would have widened and made more flexible the
remedies available to aggrieved persons. See generally Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 506 Before the Senate Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. For the story of the final defeat of this bill,
the most important piece of civil rights legislation of the 1970's, see Tolchin,
Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as Senate Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B8, col. 3.
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and the Housing and Community Development Act of

1974.26
Until an anxious President Johnson and a largely reluctant
Congress joined forces to pass Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968,27 the federal government had rarely taken noteworthy steps
toward the goal of achieving equal housing opportunity.2 8 Because
25. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1976).

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires

lending institutions to maintain data on the number and dollar amount of
mortgage and home improvement loans which are originated or purchased by
each institution, showing the location of each loan by census tract or zip
code. Id. Yet Congress included little in the Act to combat redlining
actively. Lenders are simply directed to describe to regulating agencies the
loans that they make, and no data are required on the percentage of loans
refused to minorities or women. See id. Thus, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data do not permit an overall view of the adverse civil rights
impacts of redlining. Congress' true mood may have been most revealed in
subsection (c), which states: "Nothing in this title is intended to, nor shall it be
construed to, encourage unsound lending practices or the allocation of credit."
Id. § 2801(c) (emphasis added).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(f), 5304(a) (4) (1976). The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 authorizes the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to make housing assistance payments on behalf of low income
families, and it requires localities receiving funds to submit housing assistance
plans as part of their community development bloc grant applications. Id.
But as Michael Danielson has explained, Congress did not design the Act to
have a desegregating effect on all-white suburbs. See M. DANIELSON, THE
POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 214 (1976).
27. See notes 33-73 and accompanying text infra.
28. See, e.g., T. DYE, THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY 67-68 (1971); H. RODGERS
& C. BULLOCK, supra note 20, at 139-57; Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing
Policies: Political and Legal Trends, 8 CUM. L. REv. 619, 619-20 (1978).
Because of lingering resistance to housing desegregation, the federal
government has never supplanted state or local authority with regard to fair
housing as it has in the field of voting rights. For a review of the supplanting
of state and local power in the area of voting rights, see C. HAMILTON, supra
note 14, at 70-87. H. RODGERS 8C C. BULLOCK, supra note 20, at 15-49, 157. As
President Carter's first Secretary for Housing and Urban Development, Patricia
Harris, stated:
[I]n the last 10 years we have had experience with areas of elimination
of discrimination, for example, voting rights discrimination, where
we have had clear enforcement powers and where success has been
clear. We have had to compare with that the title VIII authority
where there is no enforcement power. And we see an enormous
difference.
Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 36 (remarks of Secretary Harris).
Prior to the passage of Title VIII, the only recourse for persons discriminated against in the housing market was costly and time-consuming private
litigation. Other federal laws and constitutional provisions that could have
been utilized by the federal government to fight housing discrimination were
long ignored. Two of the oldest are the fourteenth amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. The fourteenth amendment provides no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For decades, these provisions were not construed to support the concept of fair housing. And while the Civil Rights Act
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of congressional resistance, however, Title VIII was substantially
weakened before it ever reached President Johnson's desk for signing. Title VIII was "the result of political compromise, a product
more of the desire for passage than the desire for a rational scheme
for uprooting discrimination." 29 As former Senator Birch Bayh
noted, "the political realities of [1968 lead to a] compromise . ..
forced upon the proponents of the Title VIII bill setting up the
present enforcement procedure-a result of which was that the law
could not be enforced." 30 Title VIII experienced a "tangled history," in which "compromise . . .did away with the administrative

cease and desist powers" of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) which, among other things, were imperative
to effective enforcement of the law.8 1 The congressional bargaining of 1968 crippled the enforcement of Title VIII by providing
HUD with only powers of "conference, conciliation, and persua32
sion" in resolving housing discrimination complaints.
Comprehensive legislation to fight housing discrimination was
not introduced in Congress until 1966, 33 and it was President
Johnson who assumed the leadership role that resulted in the law's
enactment.8 4 Indeed, Johnson was the first president to urge a
national fair housing statute during the twentieth century.3 5 In
his State of the Union message of January 8, 1964, Johnson pledged
his administration to the goal of eliminating housing discrimination
and asked Congress to pass related legislation. 6 On January 27,
of 1866 provides: "[AIl1 citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,"
this statutory provision was virtually dormant for over a century. See 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), construed in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
29. Note, Discrimination in Employment and Housing: Private Enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834-35

(1969).
30. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 2 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
31. Id. at 46 (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
32. See notes 117-25 and accompanying text infra.
33. H.R. Doc. No. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1966). The bill was
introduced by Congressman Celler of New York on May 2, 1966.
34. For a contrary view, see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
35.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY

SERVICE,

CIVIL RIGITS

PROGRESS

REPORT

6

(1971).
36. 1963-64-1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 116 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC PAPERS].

STATES:

In his
1964 State of the Union message, Johnson stressed:
Let me make one principle of this administration abundantly
clear: All of these increased opportunities-in employment, in education, in housing, and in every field-must be open to Americans of
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1964, Johnson once more spoke out publicly in favor of fair housing.sr This was long before a congressional majority had ever
seriously considered the idea, for no hearings had yet been scheduled
or convened on the subject.
Congress did not budge, but the President was persistent. In
his January 12, 1966, State of the Union message, he recommended
that Congress "take additional steps to insure equal justice for all
of our people . . . by outlawing discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing." 88 Two weeks later, in his message to Congress
on a program for cities and metropolitan areas, Johnson stated:
The programs I have proposed-in rebuilding large
areas of our cities, and in metropolitan planning-are
essential for the rebirth of urban America.
Yet at the center of the cities' housing problem lies
racial discrimination. Crowded miles of inadequate dwellings-poorly maintained and frequently over-priced-is the
lot of most Negro Americans in many of our cities. Their
avenue of escape to a more attractive neighborhood is
often closed because of their color.
The Negro suffers from this, as do his children. So
does the community at large. Where housing is poor,
schools are generally poor. Unemployment is widespread.
Family life is threatened. The community's welfare
burden is steadily magnified. These are the links in the
chain of racial discrimination.
This Administration is working to break that chainthrough aid to education, medical care, community action
programs, job retraining, and the maintenance of a vigorous economy.
The time has come when we should break one of its
strongest links-the often subtle, but always effective force
of housing discrimination. The impacted racial ghetto
will become a thing of the past only when the Negro
American can move his family wherever he can afford to
do so.
every color. As far as the writ of Federal law will run, we must
abolish not some, but all racial discrimination. For this is not
merely an economic issue, or a social, political or international issue.
It is a moral issue, and it must be met by the passage this session of
the bill now pending in the House.
Id.
37. Id. at 234.
38. 1966-1 id. at 3. See also id. at 5.
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I shall, therefore, present to the Congress at an early
date legislation to bar racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing. 89
On April 28, 1966, in a special civil rights message to Congress,
the President also emphasized that the legislative branch should
"declare a national policy against racial discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing, and . . . create effective remedies against dis-

crimination in every part of America." 40 When the House finally
passed a weak version of the fair housing law on August 9, 1966,
41
President Johnson issued a statement approving the House's action.
But Johnson was disappointed. "This provision is not," he stressed,
"as comprehensive as that we had sought." 42 He added: "Our
attention turns now to the Senate, and we join in the hope and
expectation that final action on the Civil Rights Act of 1966 will

follow without unnecessary delay." 43
However, in 1966, fair housing legislation "could scarcely get

off the ground in the Senate." 44 The vast majority of senators
apparently subscribed to the view that the federal government
should not interfere with property rights and that every individual
has the right to do whatever he pleases with his private property. 45
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 89.
at 462.
1966-2 id. at 814-15.
at 814.
at 815.

44. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1629 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY HISTORY].
Clearly, there

was no Senate majority in favor of fair housing legislation in 1966.

See notes

45-46 and accompanying text infra.

45. On the premium placed on private property by the participants in
the congressional debates, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, 2 CONGRESS
AND THE NATION: 1965-1968, at 378 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESS AND

THE NATION]. Indeed, this idea is still in vogue with many congressmen.
For example, in 1979, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, a Republican from Utah,
stated that legislation updating Title VIII would lead to further "federal
oppression," and "inordinate controls" by the federal government, "interfering
with property rights" and "abrogating the rights of our society."
Senate
Hearings,supra note 24, at 39 (remarks of Sen. Hatch). Similarly, Senator Alan
K. Simpson, a Republican from Wyoming, expressed concern over narrowing
the exemptions allowed under Title VIII, stating that "with such 'conformity,'
I think we are heading into some real problems with regard to private owner-

ship of private property."

Id. at 43 (remarks of Sen. Simpson).

The point

is that these notions persist, despite the fact that because of discrimination in
the rental and sale of housing, many minorities are forced to live in housing

characterized by overcrowded, disproportionately expensive, deteriorating, substandard conditions, in neighborhoods that have high crime rates and poor
public services.

See Lamb, supra note 9, at 388-91.

See also notes 1-8 and

accompanying text supra.
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The Senate failed to pass the proposed 1966 legislation.46 The
following year, congressional advocates of fair housing, led by Congressman Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York, were willing to settle for any statute that was "politically feasible." 7
Johnson was clearly upset with the Senate's refusal to pass the
1966 fair housing proposal. 48 On February 15, 1967, the President
presented, in detail, an outline of his legislative proposal to Congress, and urged once more that the majority overcome its entrenched opposition to housing desegregation. 49 The proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1967 contained a watered-down, "politically
feasible" fair housing provision. ° Once more it passed in the
House of Representatives, primarily because it was so weak that
opponents of housing desegregation viewed it as meaningless. 51
Debate on the Senate floor, however, was prolonged for over a
month by southern Democrats, who condemned fair housing as
46. The Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, chaired by Senator John Sparkman, a
Democrat from Alabama, refused to report the bill out of committee. See
Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN
L.J. 149, 150 (1969).
47. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1629. A parallel proposal in
the Senate was introduced by Walter F. Mondale, a Democratic Senator from
Minnesota. See Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 149.
48. 1967-1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 36, at 188. President Johnson
stated:
Last year I proposed the enactment of important civil rights legislation. I proposed that legislation because it was right and just.
The civil rights legislation of 1966 was passed by the House
of Representatives, and brought to the floor of the Senate. Most of
its features commanded a strong majority in both Houses. None of
its features are defeated on the merits.
Yet it did not become law. It could not be brought to a final
vote in the Senate.
Some observers felt that the riots which occurred in several cities
last summer prevented the passage of the bill ...
We want public order in America, and we shall have it. But
decent public order cannot be achieved solely at the end of a stick,
nor by confining one race to self-perpetuating poverty.
Let us create the conditions for a public order based upon
equal justice.
Id. At one point, Johnson is reported to have offered to send United States
Air Force planes to bring fair housing advocates back to Washington from
their home states to cast crucial votes. See Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 155.
49. See 1967-1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 36, at 184-95.
50. Id. at 188.
51. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1629. Only one provision of
the 1967 proposal was aimed at fair housing. Id. The remainder was designed to protect civil rights workers in the South from violence and intimidation, as was true of the subsequent 1968 Act. Id. See also Hearings on
H.R. Res. 1100 Before the Comm. on Rules of the House of Representatives,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 & 2 (1968).
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"forced housing." 62 Senator Everett Dirksen, a Republican from
Illinois and the Senate minority leader, joined the southern Democrats in their opposition. 53 The bill ultimately died a slow death
in the Senate, as its predecessor had in 1966, without ever being
54
voted on.
In his civil rights message to Congress of January 24, 1968,
President Johnson pressed once more for legislation aimed at fair
housing. He stressed:
[C]onstruction of new homes is not enough-unless every
family is free to purchase or rent them. Every American
who wishes to buy a home, and can afford it, should be
free to do so.
Segregation in housing compounds the Nation's social
and economic problems. When those who have the means
to move out of the central city are denied the chance to do
so, the result is a compression of population in the center.
In that crowded ghetto, human tragedies-and crime-increase and multiply. Unemployment and educational
problems are compounded-because isolation in the central
city prevents minority groups from reaching schools and
available jobs in other areas.
A fair housing law is not a cure-all for the Nation's
urban problems. But ending discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing is essential for social justice and social
progress. 55
This time the Senate responded positively. Senator Dirksen's
role was especially critical in increasing the gradual momentum in
the Senate in favor of fair housing legislation. In February, 1968,
Dirksen switched his opposition to open housing and bargained a
52. Senate liberals, including Senators Walter F. Mondale and Robert F.
Kennedy, fought for a stronger fair housing bill, but their efforts were easily
defeated. See 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1630. See also Hearings
on S. 1328, S. 2114, & S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See generally Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 150-52; Mitchell, supra note 14, at
122-26.
53. 2 STATUTORY

HISTORY,

supra note 44, at 1630.

54. CONGREISS AND THE NATION, supra note 45, at 378. However, Senate
majority leader Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana, placed the bill
which had passed the House at the head of the Senate's agenda, to be dealt
with immediately after the Christmas recess. Id.
55. 1969-1

PUBLIC PAPERS,

supra note 36, at 61.
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compromise proposal with the Democratic leadership.6 6 This compromise bill was ultimately what became known as the Civil Rights
Act of 1968. Despite the continued opposition of several southern
senators, the bill contained a fair housing provision that was substantially stronger than anything that Congress had seriously considered in prior decades. Normal hearings on Title VIII were
avoided in 1968 since it was an amendment added during the Senate
floor debate over a committee-reported bill to provide federal
penalties for violence or intimidation in the South against those
attempting to secure the legal rights already guaranteed, at least on
paper, by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 57 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.58 Now, with the support of the Senate Democratic and
Republican leadership, a successful cloture vote cut short what
surely would have been a prolonged and bitter southern filibuster.5 ,
While forty-three amendments were proposed to dilute Title VIII
further, most of them were voted down in regular order.6 0 Floor
debate ended on March 11, 1968, with an unpredicted wide vote of
71 to 26 in favor of the entire Civil Rights Act of 1968.61
The Act was then forwarded to the House, where a great
ground swell of conservative hostility, led by Gerald R. Ford, had
been growing as the Senate's measure proceeded through floor de56. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1630. For Dirksen's own
explanation for his change of mind on open housing, see id. at 1682-85. In
part, he explained:
It will be an exercise in futility for anyone to dig up the speech
I made in September, 1966, with respect to fair housing, in which I
took the firm, steadfast position that I thought fair housing was in
the domain of the State because it was essentially an enforcement
problem ....

One would be a strange creature indeed in this world

of mutation if in the face of reality he did not change his mind....
I do not want to worsen . . . the restive condition in the United
States. . . . There are young men of all colors and creeds and

origins who are this night fighting 12,000 miles or more away from
home.
They will return. They will have families. . . . Unless
there is fair housing . . . I do not know what the measure of their

unappreciation would be for the ingratitude of their fellow citizens.
Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 157. For a review of Dirksen's subsequent actions
in favor of the fair housing provision, see id. at 155-58. See also CONGRESS
AND THE NATION, supra note 45, at 379, 381.
57. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976),
42 id. §§ 1971(a), (c), (f)-(h), 1975a-d, 2000a to 2000h-6).
58. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 434 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1976)).
59. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1630.
60. Id. at 1631. See also CONGRESS AND THE NATION, supra note 45, at
879-80.
61. 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (1968).
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Yet the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4,

1968 turned the tide against the resistance. 63 As President John F.
Kennedy's assassination had spurred the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 64 so did Dr. King's death spur the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. On the day of King's funeral, the House Rules
Committee reported the 1968 Act out for floor passage, adding credibility to the notion that "[o]nly crisis can normally greatly speed
the incremental process" of Congress' passage of far-reaching civil
rights legislation.65 As one commentator has noted, Dr. King's
assassination and the subsequent rioting "led to the irresistible
pressure for speedy passage of the Senate-voted bill." 66 The Rules
Committee limited House debate on the proposal to only one hour
and dictated that the House either accept or reject the Dirksen
compromise with no floor amendments. 6 7 Speaker John McCormack,
a Democrat from Massachusetts, scurried through the House
chamber pressing for approval of the Senate bill, while Congressman Celler urged approval in the major speech given favoring the
bill. 8 The final vote, 250 to 172, was not as close as many had
expected.6 9 Congressional liberals, responding to Johnson's leadership, had won a surprising victory.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and
particularly the history of the passage of Title VIII, demonstrates
the unique combination of political circumstances which forced
Congress to approve the legislation. It was President Johnson, not
a congressional majority, who initially recognized and emphasized
the necessity for passing Title VIII. 7
62. CONGRESS AND

THE NATION,

As Clarence Mitchell has

supra note 45, at 382.

63. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1631.
64. See Comment, supra note 20, at 830-31.
65. H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 20, at 212.
66. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1630. On the same day that
the House debated the bill, the National Guard was attempting to quell rioting only blocks away from Capitol Hill. Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 160.
It was also during the summer of 1968 that the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones,
the Court ruled that all forms of racial discrimination in public and private
housing were illegal under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). 892 U.S. at 420-22. For
the pertinent text of § 1982, see note 28 supra. Thus, within a short time of
each other, the Congress and the Court fired "two major salvos" against
housing discrimination. See Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII
and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969).

67. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1632; Dubofsky, supra note
46, at 160.
68. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1632.
69. Id.
70. See notes 33-55 and accompanying text supra.
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written, most congressmen "felt that the political risks were too
great. In effect, they were overruled when the President called for
passage of a civil rights bill that would include a fair housing
title." 71 Moreover, had it not been for Dirksen's "switch in time"
on the Senate side, and the assassination of Dr. King during the
House's action on the bill, it is unlikely that Title VIII would
ever have survived the congressional opposition. Most of the credit
for the realization of Title VIII thus lies with Johnson. Dirksen's
change of heart, the activism of a handful of congressional liberals,
and the riots that stunned the nation after King's murder were
of secondary importance. In the final analysis, the United States
ended up with a fair housing law that was quite weak in terms of
enforcement powers given to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.7 2 It was, however, significantly stronger than
the "politically feasible" compromise that many congressmen had
73
been willing to accept only a few months earlier.

III. TITLE VIII:

ITS FRAILTIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ITS REFORM

Congress' general policy declaration in Title VIII is couched
in extremely broad language proclaiming fair housing to be the
law of the land.74 Section 801 of Title VIII provides: "It is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 75 Title VIII,
as amended, goes on to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale or rental of private
or public housing.T6 However, despite these commendable standards, a careful reading of the remainder of the Act reveals important
inadequacies."
71. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 122.
72. See text accompanying notes 117-33 infra. The shrinkage of HUD's
enforcement powers was largely a compromise to placate Senator Dirksen. See

Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 157.
73. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
74. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). Naturally, before Title VIII was
amended to protect women, an obvious criticism was that its provisions were
sexually biased.

Similarly, the handicapped were not protected under the

original legislation. Not until 1979 did HUD issue regulations ensuring access
by the handicapped to federally-assisted housing. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 24, at 191.
77. For general discussions of Title VIII, some of which touch upon its
weaknesses, see generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1979) [hereinafter cited as

THE FEDERAL FAIR
THE FEDERAL FAIR
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In section 802, which contains the definitions of the terms used
in the Act, Congress made no attempt to define with precision what
constitutes "fair housing," an "unfair housing practice," or an
"aggrieved person." These omissions permit federal agencies to
construe their affirmative responsibilities to promote equal housing
opportunity narrowly. 78 The Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Veterans Administration, the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board all have
generally been ineffective in enforcing Title VIII. 79 Precise definitions by Congress would have forced these agencies to fight more
subtle forms of housing discrimination.
In section 803(b), Congress exempted two major types of housing from the reach of Title VIII: 1) single family dwellings which
are rented or sold without the use of a real estate broker by a person
owning or receiving income from up to three such dwellings, as
long as the property is not advertised as unavailable to the classes
protected by the Act; 80 and 2) housing facilities for up to four
families within which the owner also resides, the so-called "Mrs.
Murphy's boarding house" provision."' The first exemption constitutes a significant avenue for the perpetuation of housing discrimination. Individuals may still be discriminated against, and
"it makes little difference to victims of discrimination whether the
perpetrators of such discrimination own fewer than three single
family houses or more than that number." 82 By contrast, the
HOUSING

ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT];

U.S.

COMMISSION

ON

YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING
ON

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

2

THE FEDERAL

CIVIL RIGHTS

PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR HOUSING (1974)

CIVIL RIGHTS,

(1975); U.S.

ENFORCEMENT

TWENTY

COMMISSION

To

EFFORT:

[hereinafter cited as To PROVIDE . . .

FOR FAIR HOUSING]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
AN ANALYSIS OF REMEDIES OBTAINED THROUGH LITIGATION OF

DEVELOPMENT,
FAIR HOUSING

CASES (1978); D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY:
UNFINISHED FEDERAL AGENDA 55-89 (1976); H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK,
note 20; STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 1629-1837; Dubofsky,

THE

supra
supra

note 46; Lamb, supra note 9; Lamb, supra note 28; Smedley, supra note 66;
Spencer, Enforcement of Federal Fair Housing Law, 9 URB. LAW. 514 (1977);
The Federal Fair Housing Requirements, supra note 14; Note, supra note 29.
78. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 94, 148-49 (testimony of President Johnson's HUD Secretary, Robert C. Weaver). See also id. at 24 (testimony of President Carter's HUD Secretary, Patricia Harris); id. at 70-71
(testimony of President Carter's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
Drew S. Days).
79. Lamb, supra note 9, at 409-13, 416-21.

80. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 803(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1976).
81. Id. § 803(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1976).

82. Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 147 (testimony of Robert C. Weaver,
HUD Secretary under President Johnson).
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"Mrs. Murphy's" exemption, which also tends to perpetuate discrimination in housing, has been justified as tolerable on the basis
that "the degree of intimacy involved in a three- or two-family-unit
house is quite different from that of a room in an apartment or a
room in a house of a single-family unit." Is This is not to say, of
course, that we should condone discrimination by persons who
have boarders living in their homes. Rather, the premium placed
by homeowners on control over their own homes, and on the
persons to whom they desire to rent, would make it politically
unwise or even impossible to attempt to eliminate this exemption.
The political cost would probably be increased opposition to fair
housing generally.
Three major forms of housing discrimination are specifically
focused on in Title VIII. These are discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing,8 4 in the financing of housing, 5 and in the performance of brokerage services.86
Section 804 deals with discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing. Under this section, when a bona fide offer is made to
purchase or to rent, the owner cannot refuse the offer outright,
refuse to negotiate, or otherwise deny a dwelling to any person on
the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 7 Nor
may an owner discriminate "in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services, or
facilities in connection therewith." 88 These two provisions outlaw the practice known as "steerincr" 9 Moreover, an owner
cannot make any printed notices or advertisements indicating discriminatory preferences or limitations in the sale or rental of
housing.90 It is also illegal under section 804 falsely to tell or to
mislead a person into believing that housing is not available to
be inspected, rented, or sold."' Finally, "blockbusting" is prohibited. Blockbusting occurs when an owner attempts, for profit,
83. Id. at 99 (testimony of Robert C. Weaver, HUD Secretary under President Johnson). Secretary Weaver nevertheless opposed the "Mrs. Murphy's"
exemption. Id.
84. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
85. Id. § 805, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976).
86. Id. § 806, 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976).
87. Id. § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
88. Id. § 804(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976).
89. For a discussion of the courts' construction of the anti-steering provisions of the Act, see notes 205-95 and accompanying text infra.
90. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(c), 42 U.S.C. § 360 4 (c) (1976).
91. Id. § 804(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976).
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"to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representation regarding the entry or prospective entry
into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 92
Section 805 of Title VIII relates to discriminatory practices
in the financing of housing. It declares it to be illegal for any
lending institution which makes real estate loans to discriminate
against a member of one of Title VIII's protected classes seeking
a loan for the purpose of "purchasing, constructing, improving,
repairing, or maintaining a dwelling, or to discriminate . . . in
the fixing of the amount of interest rate, duration, or other terms
or conditions of such a loan or other financial assistance." 93
Section 806 addresses discrimination by real estate brokers.
It stipulates that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, which denies any
person "access to or membership or participation in any multiplelisting service, real estate brokers' organization or other service,
organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting
dwellings, or to discriminate against him in the terms or conditions
of such access, membership, or participation." 94 This provision
is an absolutely essential part of Title VIII. For example, in 1970,
two years after the passage of Title VIII, the St. Louis Metropolitan Real Estate Board had only about a dozen black real estate
agents out of a total membership of some 4,400. 95 One would expect that blockbusting, steering, and other discriminatory practices
would become more infrequent with the growth in numbers of
minority real estate agents. Presumably, minority agents would
be offended by these practices and might challenge them privately
or even publicly. 6
92. Id. § 804(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976). For a discussion of the courts'
construction of the anti-blockbusting provisions of the Act, see notes 172-204
and accompanying text infra.
93. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 805, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976).

94. Id. § 806, 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976).
95. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIcHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA
16-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA].
96. Section 807 of Title VIII contains a straightforward exemption for religious and private nonprofit organizations. Under § 807, such organizations
which provide housing for noncommercial purposes may give preference to
persons who are their members, provided that they do not restrict Title VIII's
protected classes from membership. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 807, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607 (1976). The exemption for religious organizations is clearly more
justifiable than the exemption for private clubs. See The Federal Fair
Housing Requirements, supra note 14, at 758-59.
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The weakest links in Title VIII are sections 808 97 and 810, 98
which deal with administration and enforcement. 99 Unlike the field
of equal employment opportunity, Congress did not create a new enforcement agency for fair housing similar to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Instead, section 808 of Title VIII stipulates that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is ultimately responsible for administering Title VIII 100 and that the
Secretary may delegate his Title VIII duties to other HUD officials
to conduct investigations, conciliations, and appeals regarding complaints of housing discrimination. 10 1 The responsibility to enforce
Title VIII has subsequently been delegated to the Assistant Secretary
for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity. 0 2 Title VIII has consequently not received the emphasis at HUD that it should have. 0 3
Moreover, HUD's civil rights field staff, which monitors the enforcement of Title VIII, is not directly answerable to the Assistant
Secretary. Instead, staff members report to HUD field officials, who
are primarily concerned with general housing programs rather than
civil rights. 0 4 Congress should have stated that the person delegated
the chief responsibility at HUD for fair housing must be primarily
concerned with the enforcement of Title VIII, and should have
required that HUD civil rights specialists in the field answer directly
to that individual rather than to housing generalists.
Section 808 also names HUD as the coordinating or leading
agency for promoting fair housing, indicating that other federal
agencies "shall cooperate with the Secretary" of HUD "to further
the purposes" of Title VIII.10 5 This coordination and leadership
97. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 808, 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1976).
98. Id. § 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
99. See notes 100-33 and accompanying text infra. Section 809 requires
the Secretary of HUD to undertake "educational and conciliatory activities"
which will further the understanding and implementation of Title VIII by
the housing industry, state and local governmental officials, and other interested
parties. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 809, 42 U.S.C. § 3609 (1976).
100. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 808(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1976).

101. Id. § 808(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(b) (1976).
102. See id. § 808(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(b) (1976).
103. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 77, at
12 & 231.
104. Id.
105. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 808(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1976). Section
808 continues by explaining the functions for which the Secretary of HUD is
responsible, including conducting, publishing, and disseminating studies concerning housing discrimination, rendering assistance to federal, state, and
local agencies, and administering Title VIII. Id. § 808(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)
(1976). For a discussion of the importance of the coordination of federal
efforts, see Lamb, Administrative Coordination in Civil Rights Enforcement:
A Regional Approach, 31 VAND. L. REV. 855, 857-61 (1978).
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role has not been effectively carried out by HUD. By 1971, three
years after the passage of Title VIII, HUD had taken few steps to
0
bring about coordination. 1°
After eight years of token coordination between HUD and other federal agencies having fair housing
duties, in 1979 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights released an extensive report detailing HUD's successes and failures as coordinator
of the federal fair housing enforcement effort. 107 The Commission
observed that while HUD had succeeded in establishing the Federal
Equal Housing Opportunity Council, the Council was a low HUD
priority and had been inept at coordinating the country's federal
fair housing enforcement activities 0
The major project of the
Council has been the promulgation of an Interagency Fair Housing
Agreement to insure that minority federal employees working
throughout the country are not discriminated against, but of the
fifty-two Council member agencies, only eight have entered into
the agreement. 0 9 Moreover, the Commission complained that the
Council "had not attempted to seek interagency solutions to the
problems of exclusionary zoning, discrimination by the real estate
industry, or the need for interagency sharing of compliance information." 110 As things stood in 1979, then, not very much fair
housing coordination had occurred, and such problems as redundancy of effort, inconsistent compliance standards, and the failure
to share civil rights data among agencies continued.
More serious inadequacies in Title VIII are revealed, however,
by an examination of HUD's fair housing enforcement powers
under section 810. This section limits HUD's powers of investigation to cases in which a complaint has been filed by a "person
aggrieved" by a discriminatory housing practice."' Even if a community is notorious for a variety of exclusionary and discriminatory
practices, HUD cannot commence enforcement activities unless
those practices are spelled out in such a complaint. 1 2 Moreover,
under Title VIII, third parties not directly affected by discrimina106. See U.S.

COMMISSION

ON

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER 148-49
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT].
FORCEMENT

FEDERAL

(1971)

CIVIL

RIGHTS

EN-

[hereinafter cited as

107. See id.

108.

THE FEDERAL

FAIR HOUSING

ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT,

supra note 77,

at 329-33.

109. Id.
I10. Id.
111. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976). See THE
FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 77, at 230. See also
Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 53, 189.
112. See note IlI supra and authorities cited therein.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/1

18

Lamb: Congress, the Courts, and Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Act of 1

1981-82]

CONGRESS, THE COURTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

1133

tion cannot file a complaint with HUD."8 This precludes civil
rights interest groups from fully mobilizing their resources to help
fight housing discrimination or to stimulate HUD's enforcement
mechanism into action. Finally, section 810 gives HUD a mere
thirty days after receiving a complaint to investigate allegations of
discrimination. 114 Senator Charles Mathias, among others, has deplored the thirty day time limitation of Title VIII. 1 5 As he observed, the Fair Housing Act "limits [HUD's] processing time with
the result that remedies are only available for a very fleeting period
of time." 116 Thus, for effective enforcement it is necessary for
Congress to extend HUD's maximum period for investigation.
More crucial is the fact that if the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development decides to pursue a complaint, the Secretary
can do so only by "informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion." 117 This single phrase has been most damaging to
effective enforcement by HUD. Because HUD is limited in its
enforcement efforts to "conference, conciliation, and persuasion,"
and is able to investigate allegations of discrimination only after a
complaint has been filed, the Department has largely taken a caseby-case approach to fighting discrimination which has had a very
limited impact. Conciliation powers must be backed up with a
credible form of legal coercion to be effective. Intransigence is so
great to civil rights generally, and to open housing in particular,
that complete reliance on conciliation is an ineffective means of
enforcement. If either party to a complaint decides to be uncompromising, "conciliation is doomed to be a futile, frustrating waste
of time and money." 118
Additionally, under section 810, HUD is not authorized to
initiate law suits in federal district court in instances in which
113. THE
at 230.

FEDERAL

FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT,

supra note 77,

114. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976). The
time constraints imposed upon HUD are further aggravated by the fact that
any complaint will often be first referred to a state agency for action. See
notes 126-33 and accompanying text supra. Finally, under § 810(b), a housing
discrimination complaint must be filed in writing within 180 days of the
alleged act, explaining what occurred, and the respondent must file with
HUD an answer to the allegation. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810(b), 42
U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1976).
115. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
116. Id. See also id. at 56 (HUD Secretary Harris explaining why it
often takes HUD longer than 30 days to conciliate a fair housing complaint).
117. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
118. Note, supra note 29, at 846.
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discrimination is apparent or even blatant. 9 Nor can HUD request a federal court to issue an injunction or a restraining order
to halt various discriminatory practices temporarily. 120 Instead,
HUD must refer cases involving a "pattern or practice of discrimi121
nation" to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution.
Since HUD thus has virtually no enforcement powers to speak of,
and since the Justice Department often files suit only in a small
percentage of the referrals sent to it by HUD, those who discriminate in violation of Title VIII need have little fear of legal sanc12
tions being imposed against them.
The fact that HUD's enforcement effort is limited to conference, conciliation, and persuasion has been criticized. Congress'
failure to empower HUD, the agency charged with administering
the law, with stronger enforcement authority has made fair housing
enforcement exceedingly difficult. 23 Senator Bayh commented that
Congress made "an empty promise [to] the American people in
1968, inasmuch as the Government, which had promised so much,
was empowered only to try to conciliate between the parties. Once
that effort is made, the Government withdraws its heretofore helpful arm and leaves the plaintiff to his own devices." 124 Former
HUD Secretary Harris contended that the difficulty with Title VIII
is that it "did not provide the Government with the tools necessary
to address [housing] discrimination effectively or to enforce the
prohibitions against it," and that "as the result of extended congressional debate in 1968 in the original civil rights bill, cease-anddesist powers for the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
were deleted from that bill." 125 Congress should amend Title VIII
to provide HUD with the necessary authority to enforce its fair

housing mandate.
119. See Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 811 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 3611(g) (1976).
See also Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 23, 59-61, 102. This impotence
should be compared with the authority granted to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to bring suit in federal court to eliminate employment discrimination. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 5 THE FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT: To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT

DIsCRIMINA-

474 (1975).
120. See note 119 supra and authorities cited therein.
121. Id.
122. See note 151 infra.
123. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 193-94 (testimony of William L.
Taylor of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
124. Id. at 2.
1
125. Id. at 21-22. See also id. at 45-47 (remarks of Sen. Mathias); id. at
176 (testimony of Anita Miller, Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board).
TION
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Section 810 also provides that a complaint filed with HUD
must, under certain conditions, first be referred by HUD to state
and local civil rights agencies before HUD may take any action
with respect to the complaint. 120 This section expresses a congressional preference that governmental action against housing discrimination must first be taken by state and local civil rights
agencies prior to federal action. It is anchored in the concept of
"cooperative federalism," 127 and the idea that plaintiffs should exhaust their state administrative remedies before turning to the
federal government 28 The referral procedure works in the following manner. If a state or local agency in a particular jurisdiction has powers to fight housing discrimination which are substantially equivalent to those adopted in Title VIII, complaints
from within that jurisdiction must be referred to that agency by
HUD. 12 9

Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have

been recognized by HUD as having fair housing laws that are "substantially equivalent" to Title VIII. i3 0 After the referral, HUD
may take no action on the complaint if, within thirty days, the
state or local agency begins proceedings and "carries forward such
proceedings with reasonable promptness." 131 Section 810 further
provides: "In no event shall the Secretary [of HUD] take further
action unless he certifies that in his judgment, under the circumstances of the particular case, the protection of the rights of the
parties or the interests of justice require such action." 132 There
is no evidence indicating that the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development has consistently relied on such "interests of justice"
to recall complaints referred to state and local agencies, however.
It appears that the "Secretary's referral is virtually permanent: unless the state or local agency does not proceed at all in the matter,
126. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (c) (1976).
127. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 57.
128. See generally, Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil

Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968).
129. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810 (c), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976).

For

the criteria used by HUD in determining "substantial equivalency," see 42
C.F.R. § 115.3 (1977).
130. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 37-38. The states are Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
131. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976).

132. Id.
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the complaint must await resolution at the hands of state authorities." 188

The referral provision should be repealed. It prevents the
Secretary of HUD from exercising his discretion in determining
the most appropriate manner to vindicate the rights guaranteed by
Title VIII in each particular case. The Secretary is compelled to
pass a Title VIII complaint along to a state or local civil rights
agency for at least thirty days if the agency meets the substantially
equivalent test.8 4 While it is entirely possible that a state or city
may have a strong equal housing opportunity law on the books, in
practice it may not be effectively implemented by state and local
officials. 1 ' When this occurs, there is no justification for referrals
or for adherence to the requirement of the exhaustion of state
remedies. This consideration is even more compelling because
there is evidence indicating that HUD is not well qualified to
determine whether state laws are in fact "substantially equivalent"
136
to Title VIII.

Furthermore, most state and local agencies have not handled
the housing discrimination complaints referred to them by HUD
in a timely or efficient manner.1 37 Indeed, because of state and
local inefficiency, HUD has attempted to retrieve or recall complaints from these agencies in about half of all referral cases.1 38
Additionally, too many restrictions have been placed on HUD's
ability to recall a complaint, before the end of the thirty day referral period, from state or local agencies which have not satisfactorily carried out their investigative and conciliatory functions.8

9

133. Note, supra note 29, at 839.
134. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24 & 189.
135. Id. at 189.
136. Note, supra note 29, at 842. For example, if state law does not
permit a state court injunction similar to that which the federal courts have

the power to issue, there is no substantial equivalency and HUD should not
refer complaints to those states. Id. at 844.

137. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 47-48. For the views of the
Attorney Generals of Ohio, Michigan, and Washington, and the views of the
Iowa Civil Rights Commission, see id. at 45-46.
138. Id. at 48 & 57. The principal reason for this high retrieval rate is
that many state and local civil rights agencies have inadequate budgets and
staffs that are too small to handle their fair housing responsibilities. Id. at
57. As of 1979, Congress had never appropriated funds to state and local
agencies with substantial equivalency status to help resolve this problem, even
though § 816 permits such aid when HUD utilizes their services and receives
fair housing assistance from state and local agencies. Id. at 57. See Fair
Housing Act of 1968 § 816, 42 U.S.C. § 3616 (1976).
139. Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 48-49, 53.
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Former HUD Secretary Harris noted: "The Secretary ought to
have the ability to bring back into the Federal process matters referred [to] secur[e] consistency of approach and [to] insur[e] the
resolution of the rights of the aggrieved." 140 She also pointed out:
"It is not consistent with the full responsibility lodged in the
Secretary to enforce the Fair Housing Act to remove from the
Secretary the authority to monitor and if necessary recall a charge
which has been referred." 141
The referral system adopted by Congress is an unnecessary
provision that places too much power in the hands of state and
local agencies. American history teaches that reliance on local
units of government to promote civil rights is misplaced. This has
obviously been true with regard to school desegregation 142 and
voting rights. 143 There is no reason to believe that state and local
agencies will perform more effectively in fighting discrimination in
the area of open housing.
Section 811 of Title VIII bestows on HUD the right to examine evidence and copy documentary evidence in its investigation
of a fair housing complaint. 4 4 The Secretary of HUD may issue
subpoenas for evidence if the respondent refuses access to the information. 145 If there is noncompliance with the subpoena, HUD
may bring an action for enforcement in federal district court. 46
The congressional oversight hearings, however, give no indication
that HUD has regularly gained full access to such evidence, or that
HUD's subpoena power has been effective in practice.
If the Secretary of HUD or his designated representative determines that a fair housing suit should be filed in district court,
47
Title VIII directs the Attorney General to conduct the litigation.
Moreover, the Attorney General and the Justice Department play
140. Id. at 48.
141. Id. at 53.
142. See A. BLAUSTEIN & C. FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 240-71
(2d ed. 1962); McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1016-66 (1956). See generally J. PELTASON,
FIFTY EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961) (examines role of United States district court judges in enforcing

compliance with the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
143. See C. HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 70-87; D. STRONG, NEGROES,
BALLOTS AND JUDGES: NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 60-89 (1968).

144.
145.
146.
147.

Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 811(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (1976).
Id.
Id. §811(e), 42 U.S.C. §3611(e) (1976).
Id. § 811(g), 42 U.S.C. § 36 11(g) (1976).
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key roles in the decision to institute a law suit to enforce Title VIII.
Section 813 provides in part: "Whenever the Attorney General has
reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of [housing discrimination,] he
may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district
court .... , 148 However, the Department of Justice is not directed
to initiate suits involving individual acts of housing discrimination
that fall short of a "pattern or practice." 149 Nor is explicit authority given to the Justice Department to intervene in private litigation that could potentially have significant implications for the
future of fair housing law generally. 150 Moreover, there are inadequacies in the manner in which the Justice Department carries out
the functions that are assigned to it under the 1968 Act. In
particular, Title VIII's instructions to the Department of Justice
permit it too much discretion in deciding whether legal action will
be pursued at all by the federal government. The Justice Department, in many instances, has decided not to ask for an injunction
or to file a suit, even though HUD has discovered a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination in violation of Title VIII.' 51 This has
led Gary Orfield to conclude, correctly, that during the late 1970's
the Department of Justice "initiated no important litigation against
suburban housing exclusion." 152 Therefore, with respect to the
likelihood of legal action by the Justice Department, the Title VIII
standards are not stated as forcefully or as unequivocally as they
should be. Since fair housing enforcement is often dependent on a
viable threat of litigation by the Department of Justice, and since
such a threat is often not forthcoming, Title VIII has had only a
limited impact on widespread practices of housing discrimination
53
in the United States.'
148. Id. §813, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976).
149. See THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT,

supra note 77,

at 230.
150. See id.
151. See FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 106, at
147. Two years after the enactment of Title VIII, HUD had referred 33
Title VIII complaints to the Justice Department, which in turn filed law suits
in 22 of those cases. Id. In 1979, eleven years after the passage of Title VIII,
the Justice Department had filed less than 30 Title VIII law suits per year, and
on the average only 3 of those 30 cases had been referred to Justice by HUD.
THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 77, at 31.
152.

FEDERAL AGENCIES AND URBAN

153. See

at 31.

SEGREGATION,

supra note 15, at 13.

THE FEDFAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note
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Finally, various omissions in Title VIII suggest that the law
should be amended. First, the awarding of attorneys' fees in private suits is restricted by Title VIII to those plaintiffs who are "not
financially able" to pay their own attorneys' fees. 1 54 Title VIII is
the only federal civil rights statute that limits the award of lawyers'
fees to plaintiffs unable to pay. 155 Thus, this provision has had a
"chilling effect on potential private litigants whether they seek to
secure their rights for their own sake or for the general public
welfare." 156 Second, Title VIII completely ignores various forms
of exclusionary zoning which the United States Supreme Court has
been unwilling to strike down as unconstitutional. 157 For example,
Title VIII does not forbid local zoning ordinances which have a
disproportionate impact on minorities, such as ordinances that institute minimum requirements for lot size and square footage. Nor
does Title VIII address local prohibitions against the building of
apartment complexes or the use of mobile homes. Third, while
data regarding the racial and ethnic groups which are receiving
benefits from federal housing programs are essential for uncovering
housing discrimination,'158 Title VIII does not explicitly require
data collection and reporting by federal agencies and departments. 159
Therefore, most federal agencies responsible for the implementation
of Title VIII have not even required the persons and institutions
that they regulate to collect adequate data regarding fair housing.160
Even when they have, quantifiable standards for identifying the
presence of housing discrimination either have not been issued as
regulations, or the regulations that have been issued are so vague as
to be of only marginal value. 161 Nor does Title VIII indicate that
154. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).

155. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 70 (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Days).
156. THE

FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING

ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT,

supra note 77,

at 230.
157. See Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the
Activist-Restraint Debate, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 169, 223-26 (1979); Sager, Insular

Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1375, 1424-25 (1978).
158. See To PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR HOUSING, supra note 77, at 333. See
generally Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases,
34 MD. L. REV. 59 (1974) (analyzes usefulness of statistics to prove discrimination in fair housing suits).
159. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 77,
at 230.
160. See To PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR HOUSING, supra note 77, at 333, 340,

353-54.
161. Id. See also id. at 331-340, 350-51, 353-54, 357.
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"testers" can or should be used to determine whether unfair housing
16 2
practices exist.
In short, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 contains a
number of weaknesses which many congressmen could easily have
foreseen in 1968, but their willingness to compromise with their
more conservative colleagues resulted in significant gaps in the major
federal fair housing law. Title VIII gives HUD no meaningful enforcement powers and relies too heavily on the Justice Department's
discretion to decide whether to prosecute even the cases in which a
pattern or practice of housing discrimination is evident.168 Complaints of persons discriminated against in the housing market are
handled in twenty-two states and the District of Columbia by civil
rights agencies that have "substantial equivalency" status lodged
with them by HUD. 6 4

This referral procedure should be com-

162. See THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 77,
at 230. As the United States Commission on Civil Rights has emphasized:
Testing involves comparing the experiences with the same broker,
builder, or lender of a majority group and a minority group representative, who purport to have identical characteristics, such as income
and family size, and to have identical preferences for housing. If the
treatment received by the minority group member differs from that
afforded the majority group member, the existence of housing discrimination can often be established. Without specific authorization
to do so, both HUD and the Department of Justice have been reluctant to use Federal resources in this manner.
Id. For a major study using testers to detect the extent of housing discrimination in America, see HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY, supra note 9. This
study was conducted for HUD in 40 major metropolitan areas by the National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. The study showed that
despite the relatively large number of federal statutes, court decisions, and
executive orders making housing discrimination illegal, in 29.1% of all instances
in which blacks sought to rent housing, they were the victims of discrimination
in some form. See Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 165 (summarizing study's
findings). The comparable figure for discrimination in the sale of homes to
blacks was 21.5%. See id. Second, it was found that when a black contacts
four different real estate agents, there is a 75% chance that he will encounter
discrimination in rentals and a 62% chance in sales. See id. Third, the study
examined the process of steering-a practice whereby real estate agents show
property for rent or sale only or primarily in neighborhoods in which the
client's racial group is already dominant. The finding was that steering is
"probably the single most widely practiced form of racial discrimination in
the [housing] sales market." See id. However, the extent to which steering
occurs is not included in the above figures on discrimination. See id. Perhaps
most significantly, the data on steering indicated "that equal treatment was
accorded to whites and blacks in only 30 percent of [the cases] in the rental
market and in only 10 percent in the sales market." Id. at 166. In other
words, as of 1978, 70% of all whites and blacks in 40 major American cities
were steered into "their own neighborhoods" where rental property was being
sought, and in 90% of all the cases in which their aim was to purchase
housingl This is not, needless to say, equal opportunity to housing.
163. See notes 147-53 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 126-43 and accompanying text supra.
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pletely abandoned, for the reasons offered above. 165 Since the
1 6
remedy for housing discrimination belongs at the federal level, 8
greater enforcement powers must be given to HUD and the Department of Justice. The Fair Housing Amendments bills of 1979 and
1980 were proposed to rectify these problems. 6 7 William L. Taylor
appropriately called these bills "part of the unfinished agenda of
civil rights legislation of the 1960's." 108 Indeed, in 1979 and 1980,
Congress was finally facing important facets of federal fair housing
law that should have been dealt with in 1968. So if, as Orfield
argues, Congress took the initiative in 1968, it did an extremely
poor job in exercising leadership, and it failed to carry through with
its "unfinished agenda" in 1979 and 1980.169
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

IV.

OF THE BLOCKBUSTING AND

RACIAL STEERING PROVISIONS OF TITLE

VIII

Despite its aforementioned deficiencies, it is incorrect to conclude that Title VIII is a meaningless piece of legislation. Even
in light of the political compromises that led to its weaknesses and
ambiguities, congressional leaders did have the votes to pass two
particularly important provisions. These provisions prohibit block-

busting

170

and racial steering 171 under certain circumstances.

This

section examines how the federal courts have construed these provisions of Title VIII.
A. Blockbusting
Blockbusting is outlawed by section 804(e) of Title VIII. That
section provides that it is unlawful "to induce or attempt to induce
any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding
the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or
persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"
for profit. 7 2 Blockbusting is therefore a term primarily used to
165. See notes 134-41 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 137-43 and accompanying text supra.
167. For a discussion of these bills, see note 24 supra.
168. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 188.
169. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
170. See Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976).
For a discussion of blockbusting and § 804(e), see notes 172-204 and accompanying text infra.

171. See Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(a) & (b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) &
(b) (1976). For a discussion of racial steering and § 804(a) & (b), see notes
205-95 and accompanying text infra.
172. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976).
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describe the profit-making activities of real estate brokers who attempt to induce or hasten "white flight" from a neighborhood by
instilling in white homeowners the fear of an imminent racial turn7 3
over in the makeup of their neighborhoods.
When a minority family is able to penetrate the invisible wall
of housing segregation, realtors have used blockbusting to make
large profits and to turn the community into one which is soon
mostly minority. Blockbusting typically occurs in lower and middle
class white areas in which minorities can afford to purchase homes.
The real estate agent usually sells a house to a minority family and
then passes the word around the neighborhood that a minority
family is moving in. Soon thereafter, realtors encourage other
74
whites to sell before their property values precipitously decline.
In the classic form of blockbusting, the broker approaches a homeowner in a targeted neighborhood, informs him that minorities are
moving in, spins tales of rising crime rates, declining property
values, and deteriorating public schools, makes assorted other
prophecies of impending doom, and attempts to persuade the homeowner to sell "before it's too late." 175 The broker may attempt to
lend credence to his prediction of a "minority invasion" by showing
homes in the area only to minority customers, in as highly visible a
manner as possible, and by publicizing his increasing activities
17
through the use of "for sale" or "sold" signs.
Blockbusting does not, however, directly deny housing to
minorities. Indeed, the practice is premised on the sale to minorities of the departing whites' homes. Yet blockbusting is inimical
to residential integration. Successful blockbusting insures that a
neighborhood can be desegregated only temporarily and contributes
to what former Senator Walter F. Mondale deplored as "the rapid,
block-by-block expansion of the ghetto." 177 Title VIII therefore
173. Blockbusting has been the subject of a considerable amount of commentary. See Glassberg, Legal Control of Blockbusting, 1972 URB. L. ANN.
145; Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170 (1970). Obviously, blockbusting
can be extremely lucrative for real estate brokers. Not only does the blockbuster profit from his commissions on the numerous resulting sales, but he
may also be able to enhance his profit by following a strategy of buying
cheap from panicked whites and selling dear to minorities. See H. RODGERS
& C. BULLOCK, supra note 20, at 144; Comment, The First Amendment: A
Blockbuster's Best Friend, 46 UMKC L. REV. 425, 426-27 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as A Blockbuster's Best Friend]; Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and
Legislative Response to Real Estate Dealers' Excesses, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 818,
820-21 (1973).
174. H. RODGERS 8C C. BULLOCK, supra note 20, at 144.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).
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contains an explicit anti-blockbusting provision which clearly makes
illegal the classic form of blockbusting described above.
Federal courts have ruled that the "for profit" language in
section 804(e) does not require that the broker actually receive a
profit from a transaction. 178 The profit requirement is met if the
broker stands to receive a sales commission 179 or attempts to purchase the property with the expectation of reselling it at a higher
price. s0 The blockbuster need not be successful in inducing a
sale.' 8 ' However, federal courts have not agreed as to whether
section 804(e) prohibits racial representations that are responses to
questions from the white homeowner and not initiated by the real
82
estate agent.
A potential blockbuster will attempt to tailor his or her behavior so that it falls outside Title VIII's strict language and literal
proscription. Explicit representations as to minority entry will be
avoided. The broker may depend upon euphemisms, referring, for
example, to the "changing neighborhood" or to "what is going on
in the neighborhood," 183 or may approach the white homeowner
with minority customers in tow. 8 4 Indeed, the blockbuster is often
able to ply his trade without making any representations at all,
explicit or veiled, regarding minority entry into the neighborhood.
Once minorities have entered the area, rumors begin to circulate,
whites increasingly list their homes for sale, and real estate brokers
are attracted to the neighborhood "like flies to a leaking jug of
honey." 185 Moreover, because Congress did not expressly forbid
door-to-door and telephone contacts by blockbusters, or mass mailings to whites within a particular neighborhood, "[c]onstant solici178. See Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ga.
1969).
179.
180.
181.
182.

Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 294-95 (D. Md. 1973).
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 485 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Compare United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352, 361 (E.D.Tenn.

1974), afJ'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) and United States v. Mintzes,
304 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D. Md. 1969) with Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028,
1051 & n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd mem. and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th

Cir. 1977) and Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga.
1969).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Tenn.
1974), aff'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mitchell, 327
F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
185. United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
afl'd sub nom. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
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tation of listings goes on by all agents.., to the point where owners
and residents are driven almost to distraction." 186 As one federal
judge noted in the leading case of United States v. Mitchell: 187
In this maelstrom the atmosphere is necessarily charged
with Race, whether mentioned or not, and as a result there
is very little cause or necessity for an agent to make direct
representations as to race .... On the contrary both sides
already know, all too well, what is going on. . . . [T]he
direct mention of race in making the sale is superfluous
and wholly unnecessary. 8 8
In Mitchell, the defendants, real estate brokers, argued that
some of their salesmen had not made explicit representations as to
black entry. 89 The court recognized, however, that a narrow interpretation of section 804(e) would severely hamper its effectiveness
in combatting blockbusting. 90 The court therefore went beyond
the literal language of Title VIII and assumed arguendo that "Congress surely did not intend that in order to violate the Act a salesman must say, 'For my own profit, I would like to induce you to
sell your house by telling you that Negroes are moving into your
neighborhood.' "191 In denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court defined a section 804(e) "representation"
as "any act or words that would be likely to convey to a reasonable
man, under the circumstances, the idea that members of a particular
race ... are or may be entering his neighborhood," 192 and went so
far as to indicate that its definition might encompass mailed solici186. Id.
187. 335 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afl'd sub nom. United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826
(1973).
188. 335 F. Supp. at 1006. Of course, if even a few brokers are engaging
in the classic form of blockbusting, the mere solicitation of listings by other
brokers is relatively likely to be successful, thus hastening the area's racial
turnover. In particular, the activities of minority realtors, who confine most
of their operations to minority or transitional neighborhoods, often contribute
to the racially-charged atmosphere. As one court has noted, once white
brokers have initiated the blockbusting process, the minority realtor "follows
into the area, and, even when his conduct is within the limits of the law, the
effect of his presence, many times, is to speed the racial transition of the area."
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1055 & n.12 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afJ'd mem.
and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976).
189. See United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1971)

(order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment).
190. Id. at 479.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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tations that made no mention of race. 19 Clearly, then, in an effort
to combat the more subtle forms of blockbusting, the Mitchell court
went beyond what Congress had expressly provided in Title VIII.
In its decision on the merits, the Mitchell court did not have
to indicate exactly how its test might be applied because it found
sufficient evidence of explicit racial representations to establish that
the defendant realtors were engaged in a "group pattern or practice"
of blockbusting. 19 4 In Zuch v. Hussey,1 5 however, another federal
district court gave the Mitchell definition an extremely broad application. The Zuch court declared that the racial atmosphere in
one transitional area of Detroit was such that any solicitation of
listings made for profit and aimed at inducing a sale "would convey
to a reasonable man the idea that members of a particular race are
19 6
or may be entering the area" and thus violate section 804(e).
Accordingly, two realtors who had conducted solicitation campaigns
that would seemingly fall outside the literal meaning of Title VIII
were held to have violated section 804(e).107 Each realtor was enjoined from all uninvited personal, telephone, or mail solicitations
of listings from individual homeowners at their residences. 198
In neighborhoods in which the atmosphere is "charged with
race," the Zuch approach could logically be extended to prohibit
other broker conduct, such as the use of "for sale" or "sold" signs,
which conveys the message that racial transition is underway. Such
an interpretation of section 804(e) would, however, appear to run
afoul of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Lin193. Id. at 490-91 & n.2.
194. See 335 F. Supp. at 1006 & n.2. Compare id. (decision on the merits)
with United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 478-80 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (denial

of defendants' motion for summary judgment).
In its decision on the merits, the Mitchell court took the position that,
while an individual pattern or practice of § 804(e) violations would have to
involve repeated instances of "direct racial representation," a group pattern
or practice of prohibited blockbusting was established by a showing that at
least one of each defendant's salespersons had made an explicit statement as
to black entry, even if many salespersons had merely solicited listings in the
area. 335 F. Supp. at 1006.
195. 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afJ'd mem. and remanded, 547
F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
196. 394 F. Supp. at 1052. The Zuch court was faced with considerable
evidence of classic blockbusting by several realtors, coupled with massive uninvited solicitation of listings and blatant racial steering. See id. at 1031-46.
The court declared that the racial fears of the area's white residents had
become so extreme as to reflect an "hysterical community psyche." Id. at 1030.
197. Id. at 1052-53.
198. Id. at 1056. By comparison, the Mitchell defendants were enjoined
from conducting a greater amount or different kind of solicitation in black
or transitional areas than in white neighborhoods. 335 F. Supp. at 1007.
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mark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro.'99 The Court in
Linmark struck down as violative of the first amendment a local
ordinance that banned such signs. 200 The Linmark decision, however, was partly premised on findings that there had been no "panic
selling" in the town in response to the signs.2 0 Barrick Realty, Inc.
v. City of Gary,202 in which the Seventh Circuit upheld a similar
ordinance, was expressly distinguished by the Linmark Court as
involving a record showing that racial transition was underway,
although the Supreme Court declined to state whether the court of
appeals' decision was correct. 20 3 Clearly, then, the Zuch interpretation of the statute would come into play only in a factual situation
2 4
akin to Barrick Realty. 0
In short, Title VIII has not eliminated the practice of blockbusting. This lingering practice could have been precluded, however, by a more specific and detailed statutory provision by Congress.
Since such a provision was not enacted, the lower federal courts
have exercised a great deal of latitude in interpreting what activities
fall within the parameters of section 804(e). These decisions, rather
than the original legislation, are potentially the most effective means
of fighting all but the most blatant forms of blockbusting.
B. Racial Steering
According to a 1979 report published by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, racial steering is "probably the
single most widely practiced form of racial discrimination in the
[housing] sales market." 205 Steering encompasses a variety of practices employed by real estate brokers to direct homeseekers toward
or away from particular neighborhoods according to the buyer's
206
race.
Prior to the enactment of Title VIII, steering often took the
form of an explicit refusal to show or sell any home in a neighborhood with inhabitants of a different race than the prospective buyers,
199. 431 U.S. 84 (1977).
200. Id. at 97.
201. See id. at 95.
202. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).

203. See 431 U.S. at 95 & n.9.
204. For a discussion of Linmark, the constitutionality of § 804(e), and
anti-blockbusting laws in general, see A Blockbuster's Best Friend, supra note
173, at 434-53.
205. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 165. See note 9 supra and
authorities cited therein.
206. See Comment, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title
VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809-10, 816-18 (1976).
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or misrepresentations as to the availability of homes in that neighborhood, 20

7

especially when the buyer was a minority and the

neighborhood was white. 208 Such overt, racially-premised refusals
to deal are relics of an era when a dual housing market was maintained by custom, legal devices, and even physical force. 20

9

These

practices are clear violations of Title VIII's sections 804(a) and
804(b).2 10 This is not to say, however, that congressional passage
of Title VIII has brought about the demise of steering practices
involving refusals to rent or sell.2 1 1

Brokers still can and do insure

207. See Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528, 529 (7th Cir.

1973). One favorite tactic of brokers has been to blame the owner for the
refusal to deal with a minority buyer. See R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND
PRACrICES or REAL ESTATE BROKERS 42 (1969). Another tactic has been to
refer the customer to another broker, often a minority broker, who is supposedly better situated to aid the buyer. See United States v. Northside Realty
Assocs., Inc., 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. (P-H) 13,552, at 13,720 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
aff'd and remanded, 474 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976).

208. One sociologist, describing practices of the 1950's and 1960's, has

identified a realtors' "exclusion ideology," which is premised on the beliefs that
most whites do not want black neighbors, that property values decline when
blacks enter a white neighborhood, that residential integration is impossible
because integrated neighborhoods inevitably become resegregated, and that
whites suffer economically and otherwise if blacks buy or rent property in
their neighborhoods. See R. HELPER, supra note 207, at 141. These premises
underlie the firmly-held belief that "by not selling . . . to a Negro in a white
area . . . the broker protects his business, his reputation, and the standard of
his community." Id. at 143. This "exclusion ideology" was encouraged by
the Federal Housing Administration which, until 1966, generally refused, on
economic grounds, to insure mortgages in black neighborhoods or of black
buyers purchasing homes in white neighborhoods. See Equal Educational
Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational
Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2754 (testimony of HUD Secretary George
Romney); A. POLIKoFF, HOUSING THE POOR: THE CASE FOR HEROISM 17-18
(1978). See generally, Rubinowitz &: Trosman, Affirmative Action and the
American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Ownership

Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 491, 511-21 (1979).

209. See Rosser & White, An Answer to Housing Discrimination, 7 Civ.
RTs. DIG. 10, 12 (Winter 1975).
210. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(a) &c(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (b)
(1976). Subsections 804(a) and (b) of the Fair Housing Act state:
[I]t shall be unlawful(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 790-91 (5th Cir.
1978) (misrepresentations as to the availability of apartments in "white" build.
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that sales to minorities occur overwhelmingly in minority or transitional neighborhoods and that sales to whites occur overwhelmingly in white communities without refusing to deal with any
customer and without making active misrepresentations.
This result is brought about by two broad types of practices.
The first is "active steering," which is advising customers, on the
basis of race, where to buy or not to buy homes.2 12 The second is
"passive steering," which is marketing homes to customers or prospective customers in such a manner that they are surreptitiously
channelled, in presumed consonance with their own desires, to
21
areas inhabited by members of their own race. 8
Active steering most typically involves advising a white customer against purchasing a home in a desegregated area. While
that advice may be couched in explicit racial terms, it often involves the use of code phrases that refer to the mixed neighborhood's "high crime rates," "declining property values," or "undesirable elements." 214 Actively steered minority customers are
warned to avoid white areas because of the supposed racial hostility
of their prospective neighbors.2 1 5 In either case, the virtues of a
"racially appropriate" neighborhood are likely to be extolled. By
contrast, passive steering most frequently involves the situation in
which a broker suggests or offers to show only homes in neighborhoods whose inhabitants are of the same race as the customer, even
though available homes in other communities might meet the cus216
tomer's specifications.
Another common steering tactic, which Congress failed to deal
with adequately in Title VIII, is the selective advertising of homes
ings within single apartment complex; blacks allowed to rent apartments only
in "black" buildings); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1975)
(refusal to sell home in "white" area to blacks; blacks were offered other homes
in "black" neighborhood); United States v. Robbins, I Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas.
(P-H) 13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (agents instructed not to show home on "white"
block to blacks); United States v. Long, I Eq. Opp. Hous. Gas. (P-H) 13,631
(D.S.C. 1974) (misrepresentations as to availability of apartments in "white"
complexes; blacks allowed to rent only in "black" complexes).
212. See Comment, supra note 206, at 810. Numerous examples of active
steering are described in Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-42 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); afJ'd mem. and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). See also
United States v. Lackey, No. 73-648-Civ-T-K (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 1974) (consent
decree prohibiting active steering of blacks or whites).
213. See Comment, supra note 206, at 810 & n.11, 817-18.
214. See id. at 810 n.10. See also Comment, Real Estate Steering and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA L.J. 758, 764 & n.32 (1977).
215. See Comment, supra note 206, at 810 n.10.
216. See id. at 817.
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in a given neighborhood so as to attract buyers of a particular race.
For example, homes in areas undergoing racial transition may be
advertised only in minority newspapers. 217 Even if the customer
discovers that the broker has listings in a "racially inappropriate"
area, the broker may passively discourage a sale by failing to expose
desirable features of the home or neighborhood that would be
emphasized to a customer of a different race.21 Except in those
instances in which the customer has an unusually strong interest
in a "racially inappropriate" area or home, the effect of these steering practices is likely to be identical to that produced by simple
racially-premised refusals to sell: the perpetuation of residential
segregation. The principal difference is that the steered customers
are less likely to discover what is actually happening when they
219
are shown homes by real estate agents.
Congress did not utilize language in Title VIII that unequivocally outlaws racial steering, and the legislative history is silent on
the matter. While one commentator has argued that several
provisions of section 804 can and should be interpreted to proscribe
active or passive steering, 220 the courts that have decided steering
cases have focused on section 804(a).2 21 Unfortunately, however,
217. See United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1151-52
(E.D. Mich. 1977). Advertisements in the general media might also be aimed
at minorities through selective use of code phrases such as "fair housing" or
"equal opportunity." See United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352, 365 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974), aff'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975).
218. See Bogen & Falcon, supra note 158, at 62-63.
219. "Affirmative" or "reverse" steering, the use of steering practices to
channel white buyers to integrated areas and black buyers to white areas,
might, of course, be employed to reduce residential segregation. Affirmative
steering has become attractive to white communities which have found that, in
attempting to lessen traditional housing and employment discrimination
against blacks, they have become the target of broker practices, such as blockbusting and traditional steering, that produce a rapid influx of blacks and
threaten resegregation. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 95,
at 21. Some of these communities, or fair housing groups within them, have
established offices that list or show homes without charge, but steer affirmatively,
particularly by encouraging blacks to buy in white areas rather than in integrated areas with black populations close to the "tipping point" that would
produce accelerating white flight if reached. See id. See also Note, Benign
Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government
Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 H~Auv. L. REy. 938, 945-46 &
n.55 (1980). Other communities have attempted to compel realtors to engage
in reverse steering. See FairHousing Act: Hearings on H.R. 3504 & H.R. 7787
Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fair
Housing Act Hearings]. The legality of these practices has not yet been the
subject of litigation.

220. See Comment, supra note 206, at 812-18.
221. Id.
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the case law has failed to clarify the status of steering under Title
VIII adequately.
While numerous steering cases have been brought to federal
courts, many have been settled by consent decrees, while others
have not proceeded past initial skirmishes over standing. Five
major Title VIII cases involving these types of racial steering have
been decided on the merits, and a violation of Title VIII was found
to have occurred in only two of these cases. 2 2 While these federal
court decisions indicate that Congress meant to prohibit at least
certain forms of steering, they do not agree on exactly which forms
of steering are outlawed. Nor do they agree on how a plaintiff
can establish that illegal steering has indeed occurred.
The first of these steering cases to be decided on the merits
under Title VIII was United States v. Saroff.223 In Saroff, the federal government brought a pattern and practice suit against a
Knoxville, Tennessee, broker who had assisted a local housing
authority in obtaining homes for blacks displaced by an urban
renewal project. 22 4 As the effort to find homes for the displacees
proceeded, a great deal of broker activity, including much uninvited solicitation, took place in previously all-white neighborhoods
adjacent to the renewal area. 225 This led to an appreciable increase

in sales in those neighborhoods as blacks entered and whites departed.2 26 Although much of the case focused on the defendant's
alleged blockbusting activities in the area, the government also
contended that the defendant had engaged in several specific instances of unlawful racial steering.227

These included using the

222. See Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (no Title VIII violation found); United States v. Welles-Bowen Co.,
1980 EQ. Opp. Hous. CAS. (P-H) (3 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas.)
15,314 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (no Title VIII violation); United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433
F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Title VIII violations involving active and
passive steering); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afl'd
mrem. and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir, 1977) (Title VIII violations involving active steering and blockbusting); United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp.
352 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), afJ'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) (no Title VIII
violations). For the steering cases that have either been settled by consent
decrees or that have not proceeded beyond initial skirmishes over standing, see
TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 859 (1976). See generally, Comment, supra note 206, at 809 n.9.
223. 377 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd meme., 516 F.2d 902 (6th

Cir. 1975).
224. 377 F. Supp. at 355-56.
225. Id. at 356.

226. Id.
227. 377 F. Supp. at 355. Although the court described the government's
steering allegations as brought under subsections (a), (b), and (d) of § 804, the
government's steering complaint in fact made no mention of § 804(b). See
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words "Fair Housing Broker" in an advertisement for a home in
the transitional area but not in an advertisement in the same newspaper for a home in a white neighborhood, advising a white tester
of a listing in the white neighborhood not given to a black customer
who had specifically requested such a listing, telling one white
customer that he would not "feel comfortable" in a particular
transitional area, telling another individual interested in a particular neighborhood that blacks were "still east" of it, and providing displaced blacks with listings only in or near the transitional
22 8
areas.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee dismissed the government's action, and, although its
rationale is not entirely clear, it apparently believed that none of
the practices described were unlawful. 229 The court declared, first,
that giving the displacees listings only in transitional areas was
"necessitated" by their preferences and by the broker's "traditional
focus" on these areas, and emphasized that the housing authority
230
had never requested the broker to provide listings in other areas.
Second, the court ruled that the listing in a white area was given
to the white tester but not to the black customer because of the
particular nature of the house in question. 231 Third, the court
concluded that the other incidents could be interpreted as either
not indicative of a desire to steer, or as based on unspecified "legitimate variables." 232 The court neither discussed the general status
of steering under Title VIII, nor analyzed any particular provision
of the statute. The fact that the court was able to find or imagine
an innocent explanation for each of the practices in Saroff suggests,
however, that it believed that steering practices would violate Title
VIII only if clearly accompanied by a malevolent segregative motive.
Comment, supra note 206, at 818 n.37. In any case, in the portion of its
opinion dealing with steering, the court did not discuss the sections nor
distinguish between them, but simply concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to prove a pattern or practice of steering. See 377 F. Supp. at 365-67.
228. 377 F. Supp. at 365-66.
229. See 377 F. Supp. at 366. The court stated that "the proof fails to
show that the citizens of this community were denied any right cognizable
under [Title VIII]."

Id.

230. Id.
231. Id. The broker had testified that the particular house was not
deemed suitable for the black customer because it would not qualify for a
federal home loan. Id. at 358. That the listing was given to a white tester
who represented her requirements as identical to those of the black customer
does not appear to have been considered by the court.
232. Id. at 366.
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The defendant brokers did not fare as well in the second case,
Zuch v. Hussey.23 8 In Zuch, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan was faced with massive evidence
of blockbusting and active steering engaged in by numerous brokers
in racially transitional areas of Detroit. 23 4 The many steering incidents involved broker advice, couched in explicit racial terms
and usually buttressed by references to declining property values
or high crime rates, and statements that the white customers, or
testers posing as customers, should avoid the integrated areas in
which they had expressed an interest.235 One black customer who
expressed an interest in an all-white suburb was advised "that he
would not be comfortable living in an area where he would have
23 6
no black neighbors" and was urged to consider an integrated area.
The Zuch court declared that racial steering was outlawed by
"that portion of [section 804(a)] which makes it unlawful to 'otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race.' "237 It defined unlawful steering as "the use of a word
or phrase or action by a real estate broker or salesperson which is
intended to influence the choice of a prospective property buyer
on a racial basis." 238 While this definition appears to require that
the broker intend to steer his customers on racial grounds, 239 the
court went on to say that race need not be the sole reason for the
broker's conduct.2 40 The court also declared that "any action by a
real estate broker which in any way impedes, delays, or discourages
on a racial basis a prospective home buyer from purchasing housing is unlawful." 241 The court noted that its interpretation was
in accord with a previous decision which indicated that Title VIII
was intended to prohibit not only blatant discrimination but, more
233. For a discussion of the blockbusting aspects of the Zuch case, see notes
195-98 and accompanying text supra.
234. See 394 F. Supp. at 1035-44.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1041.
237. Id. at 1047.
238. Id., citing United States v. Robbins, 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. (P-H)
13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
239. See Comment, supra note 206, at 820 n.45. One commentator on
racial steering has criticized this definition because it "appears to require a
showing of intent to influence buyer choice-an element that may either be
lacking or very difficult to prove in a case of [passive] steering." See id.

Later cases have borne out the prescience of this criticism. See notes 268-72
and accompanying text infra.

240. 394 F. Supp. at 1047, citing Williamson v. Hampton Management

Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

241. 394 F. Supp. at 1047.
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generally, "all practices which have a racially discouraging effect." 242 This apparent inconsistency in the court's opinion regarding an intent requirement was not crucial in Zuch itself,
because the evidence of racially explicit affirmative steering, coupled
with extensive blockbusting activities, was almost certainly sufficient
to establish the brokers' intent to steer. Yet such a construction
would obviously loom much larger in cases involving passive steering, such as Saroif, in which the broker's motives are more difficult
248
to establish.
The Zuch defendants attempted to establish that they had
offered to show their customers homes in all areas in which listings
were available, and argued that, notwithstanding any steering, they
had not made any dwellings "unavailable" and thus they fell outside the ambit of section 804(a). 244 The court dismissed this contention.245 Finding that the defendant's steering activities had
violated Title VIII, the court enjoined them from "steering or
channeling any prospective purchaser toward . . . any particular
dwelling or neighborhood because of race." 246
The third major steering decision, and the only one other than
Zuch to find a violation of Title VIII as outlined by Congress, was
United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 247 a pattern and practice

action brought against a large Detroit real estate broker. 248 Quot242. Id., citing Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis
added).
243. The adoption of an "effects test" under Title VIII, similar to that
used in employment discrimination cases under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), would presumably render racial steering unlawful irrespective
of the broker's motives. It is generally recognized that the "effects test" applies
to the Fair Housing Act. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 118 n.2.
244. 394 F. Supp. at 1048. That this argument is not implausible has
been noted by the commentators. See Comment, supra note 206, at 814-15.
245. 394 F. Supp. at 1048. The court noted:
What the defendants are asking this Court to find, in effect, is that
because of the insistence of the plaintiffs, and the reluctant submission of the defendants, there was no steering because the initial
efforts of the defendants failed. Such a conclusion is untenable.
The fact that the defendants did not succeed in steering the plaintiffs
away from the transitional neighborhoods to Detroit is not relevant;
the law makes it unlawful even to attempt.
Id., citing Smith v. Sol Adler Realty, 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971), Brown v.
State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
246. 394 F. Supp. at 1056.
247. 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
248. Id. at 1143. The defendant was formed by the purchase of four
separate Detroit brokerages, operated 27 offices, and employed approximately
400 salespersons. Id. at 1146.
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ing from Zuch,249 but carefully excising its language that alluded
to the broker's intent, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan defined unlawful steering as " 'the use
of any word or phrase or action by a real estate broker or sales
person' which influences the choice of a prospective buyer on a
racial basis or 'which in any way impedes, delays, or discourages on
a racial basis a prospective homebuyer from purchasing housing.' "250 Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's policy
of advertising homes in "changing areas" of Detroit in a blackoriented newspaper violated Title VIII because of its "racial steering effect." 251 The court so decided even though it found that the
defendant had adopted its advertising policy not because of any
motive to affect the racial composition of the area, but merely because it had "determined that the best return on its advertising
dollar [could] be realized in this way." 252
The court in Real Estate One also noted that the defendant's
biracial sales force was not integrated, and that black salespeople
were concentrated in offices in or near black or transitional areas.2 53
Additionally, it observed that even though the company had
abandoned its earlier policy of assigning salespeople to offices on a
racial basis and forbidding black salespeople from showing homes
in white areas, the previously established segregated pattern still
existed because "the company took very little affirmative action, if
any, to change it, and . . . most black salespersons, for personal
and economic reasons, real or imagined, preferred it." 254 The
court commented that salespeople tend to sell homes near their
offices, that all-white offices "attract white buyers and have a tendency to discourage black buyers," while all-black offices have a
tendency to "attract black buyers and discourage white buyers,"
and concluded that "probably nothing . . . would facilitate and
encourage some gradual and voluntary residential racial integration
more than would racially integrated sales offices." 255 Accordingly,
the court held that not only had the defendant's past assignment
policies been unlawful, but also that its failure to take "affirmative
249. See id. at 1144. The court quoted with approval from the government's proposed conclusions of law, which themselves contained quotations
from Zuch. Id.
250. Id., quoting Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975)_
251. 433 F. Supp. at 1152 (emphasis added).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1148-49.
254. Id. at 1149.
255. Id. at 1150.
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action" to overcome the effects of these policies constituted a "pattern and practice with a discernible steering effect" in violation of
Title VIII. 256 This was true even though the court realized that
the pattern of racially-segregated offices resulted "more from the
attitudes of [the defendant's] salespeople, black and white, and
from the biases of the community than from anything else." 257
Any hopes that Real Estate One might inaugurate an era in
which federal courts would interpret Title VIII to prohibit even
subtle, passive steering practices without inquiring into the broker's
motives were dashed by the 1979 decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in United States
v. Welles-Bowen Co. 258 In Welles-Bowen, the government alleged
that a Toledo broker had engaged in several acts of racial steering,
but the court found that Title VIII had not been violated. 259 The
incidents described by the court in its findings of fact suggest that
only relatively subtle steering took place. 260 The court's findings
indicate primarily that some of the defendant's salespeople told
white testers that certain areas of Toledo should be avoided be256. Id.
257. Id. The opinion describes the practices in one of the defendant's
offices-practices since abandoned-in which listing cards were coded to indicate
whether a given listing could be shown to blacks. Id. at 1153. If so, the
home would be advertised with a special telephone number. Id. Customers
calling on this "black line" would be referred to black salespeople and steered
to black or integrated neighborhoods. Id. The opinion also described many
incidents in which customers were actively steered or salespeople were instructed by their superiors not to show particular homes to black customers,
and detailed an incident in which two of the defendant's agents yielded to
pressure from a group of neighbors of a white landowner and arranged a quick
sale to one of the neighbors rather than consummate a sale to a black customer
who had paid a deposit on the property. Id. at 1154-55. The court noted
that the described office practices, essentially the work of a single office manager, had been discontinued and were completely unlikely to recur, and
further noted that the other incidents were in direct contravention of "clear,
overt" company policy. Id. at 1153.
258. 1980 EQ. OP. Hous. (P-H)
259. Id. at 15,773.

15,314 (N.D. Ohio 1979).

The government also alleged acts of sex discrimination

and racial steering in rentals. Id. at 15,774. These allegations were dismissed
as well, in part on the questionable grounds that it would have been a "vain
act" for the defendant to show apartments to customers who did not meet the
discriminatory requirements of the owners, and that two steering incidents
separated by three years were insufficient to establish a pattern and practice.
Id. at 15,766. The court also declared that the rental charges had been
rendered moot because the defendant withdrew from the rental business when
its principal rental agent retired. Id. at 15,766.
260. Id. at 15,778. Many of the described incidents simply failed to suggest any steering. See id. at 15,769-71.
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cause of "crime problems" and that the black population had reduced some neighborhoods' "rates of appreciation." 261
The clearest steering incident in Welles-Bowen involved a
white couple which had just moved to Toledo. The husband's new
place of employment, the local art museum, was in an integrated
area known as the "Old West End," and the couple specifically
stated that they would be interested in older homes in that area,
but would not be interested in tract houses. 26 2 The salesperson
made negative comments about the integrated neighborhood, referring to it as a "high crime area." 263 She spent several days
showing the couple homes in white areas, just as she testified she
would "normally" do.264 Dissatisfied with these homes, many of
which were suburban tract houses, the couple selected a number
of Old West End homes which they discovered by driving through
the area and reviewing the broker's multiple listing books.26 5 At
the couple's insistence, the salesperson took them on a tour of the
area, but she remarked that blacks were moving in.266 The couple
nevertheless purchased a home, listed with the defendant, in the
267
Old West End.
In its conclusions of law, the Welles-Bowen court declared
that racial steering violated Title VIII, and adopted the Zuch definition of steering, which it interpreted as requiring that intent
must be established in a steering case. 268 The court did not indicate what sort of showing might satisfy the intent requirement.
However, it found that any inference of discriminatory intent was
negated by the fact that the defendant made its multiple listing
books available to its clients, 269 stated that the salespeople's statements "concerning the effect on appreciation, resale value, or of
personal problems in integrated or mixed neighborhoods, are not
evidence of an 'intent' to steer in the absence of any actual steer261. Id. at 15,770-71.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 15,768.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 15,768. The court declared that while this incident showed
that the salesperson had a "preference to show white clients to white neighborhoods," it amounted to neither actual nor attempted steering. Id. The court's
reasoning was apparently based on an insufficient indication of an intent to
steer. See id.
268. Id. at 15,772.
269. Id. at 15,773.
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ing," 270 and repeated that such indications of "personal preference"
were insufficient to establish "intentional or effective racially discriminatory 'steering.' "271 The court did not make clear what it
meant by "actual" or "effective" steering, but neither was deemed
to be present in the case, probably because the customers who testified were whites who eventually purchased in an integrated area.
The testers, of course, did not purchase anywhere. The court
apparently presumed that if the broker intended to steer, it would
272
not ordinarily permit its attempts to fail.
Another important steering case to be decided under Title
VIII is Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty,278 in which, as in
Saroff and Welles-Bowen, no violation of Title VIII was found to
have occurred. Dwayne Realty involved alleged steering in the sale
of homes in Bellwood, Illinois, an older suburb of Chicago with
27 4
both racially integrated and essentially all-white neighborhoods.
The plaintiffs introduced evidence of four tests of the defendant's
salespeople. Two of these tests, one by a white couple, the other
by a black woman, failed to reveal broker conduct that would constitute illegal steering under any interpretation of Title VIII.275
270. Id. at 15,772.
271. Id. at 15,773. The court buttressed its conclusion by stating that
"none of the clients were 'talked out of areas.'" Id.
272. Although it purports to focus on intent, this approach is remarkably
similar to the argument rejected in Zuch that steering efforts are actionable
under Title VIII only if they are ultimately successful. See note 245 supra.
Either approach makes it very difficult to establish evidence of steering through
the testimony of testers, who cannot be successfully steered because they do
not buy. The Welles-Bowen approach appears slightly more liberal in that
these difficulties presumably would be overcome by a showing of a blatant,
incontrovertible racial motive. Few brokers, however, are likely to behave so
egregiously as to make this a practical difference.
273. 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
274. Id. at 1323. Following the all too familiar pattern, black homeowners had begun to be concentrated in one particular Bellwood neighborhood. See id. Local concern that this pattern was the product of racial
steering by real estate brokers led the town to file essentially identical steering
suits against several brokers. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 (1979) (upholding standing of Village and resident testers to sue
under Title VIII in steering case against other brokers). The town had also
attempted to pressure realtors to steer black customers away from areas of
heavy black concentration. See Fair Housing Act Hearings, supra note 219,
at 182-83 (letter from Bellwood's housing specialist to brokers doing business
in the area, submitted by William North, general counsel for the National
Association of Realtors).
275. See 482 F. Supp. at 1327-28. Although the white tester couple, "the
Elliotts," had said that they were steered away from one listing in an integrated
area, the broker was able to establish that that home had previously been sold,
just as the salesperson had told the couple. Id. at 1328. The black tester was
given listings in both white and integrated areas, as was the white couple. Id.
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A third test was conducted by another black woman. Although
she testified that defendant's office manager had treated her "as if
[she] had a disease," that contention was not accepted by the
court, 270 and her testimony did not otherwise indicate that she had
been steered.

27 7

A white man, who, with his wife, had conducted the fourth
test, presented the only real evidence of steering. He testified that
the defendant's salespersons told him and his wife that since the
housing north of one street was integrated, she would only show
them homes south of it, "hesitated" when they picked a home from
the listing book that was located in a predominantly black neighborhood, and told them that another home they had selected from
the book was adjacent to a heavily integrated area and that the
couple "would not want to live there." 278 Thereafter, as the salesperson and the couple went through the book, she selected eight
additional homes for their consideration. 27 9 At the couple's request, the salesperson then showed them these eight homes-but
not the two homes selected by the couple-three of which were in
28 0
integrated neighborhoods.
The salesperson testified that she had not told the couple that
she would only show them homes south of one street because the
area to the north was integrated, and added that she could not have
made such a statement since the area to the south of the street also
included an integrated neighborhood.28 1 She also denied that she
had told the couple they would be unhappy living next to an
at 1327-28. Actually, the evidence of steering may have been greater than the
court's opinion reveals. Only a few of the listings were given to more than
one tester, and the extent of integration in the various neighborhoods is not
disclosed in the opinion. It should also be noted that the plaintiff's tests were
poorly conducted: the four tests were of three different agents, one of them
an office manager who did not normally show homes; the tester's "cover stories"
differed, even as to their preferred price range; and one of the white couples
insisted on being shown homes, while the other testers merely requested listings
and the black testers told the salespeople that they wanted to discuss the listings
with their husbands before visiting any homes. Id. at 1324-29. For a description of how testing should be conducted, see HOUSING MARKET PIRAcTICEs
SURVEY,

supra note 9, at 8-20 & app. B.

276. 482 F. Supp. at 1332-33. The sales manager's version of the incidentwhich of course indicated that the black tester was shown nothing but the
utmost courtesy-was deemed more creditworthy by the court. Id.
277. Id. at 1333-34. This black tester apparently was also given listings in
both integrated and white areas. See id. at 1326, 1332.
278. Id. at 1325.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1325-26.
281. Id. at 1326.
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integrated area, and explained that she had not deliberately failed
to show the couple the two homes they had selected, but was simply
unable to get around to them within the time limit the man
282
had set.

The court deemed the salesperson's testimony to be more
creditworthy than the tester's. It declared that while the salesperson's version of the story was "straightforward" and "made
sense," 283 the tester's version was "weakened" by its failure to give
any "rational explanation" for the "somewhat bizarre" behavior it
attributed to the salesperson.28 4 If the Dwayne Realty opinion had
merely involved the court's resolution of disputed factual matters
in favor of the defendant broker, it would not be particularly noteworthy. However, the opinion lends additional weight to the Saroft
and Welles-Bowen approaches to steering, and it adopts standards
of proof that will make it nearly impossible to establish the existence of illegal steering in future cases.
Although the Dwayne Realty court accepted the Zuch definition of unlawful steering,2 5 which appears to include an intent
requirement, 286 it seems to leave open the possibility that illegal
steering might be established without any showing as to the broker's
underlying motives by its declaration that illegal steering "may be
established either by proof of purpose or effect." 287 Not only did
the court declare that the evidence before it failed to disclose any
segregative effect, but it went on to state that "this is always true
whenever a racially discriminatory practice in housing is sought to
282. Id. at 1325.
283. Id. at 1332.

284. Id. at 1331. The court declared that the salespeople earned their
living by selling real estate, and had no "personal interest" in keeping
whites out of a predominantly black neighborhood.

Id. at 1331-32.

It failed

to notice an extremely obvious and plausible explanation for the salesperson's disinclination to show the couple homes in that neighborhood: the
couple "acted in ways that would lead [her] to believe they were racially
biased." See id. at 1325. This explanation is not necessarily vitiated by the
fact that the couple was shown homes in other integrated areas, and the
saleswoman may well have assumed that prejudiced white customers might be
willing to tolerate black neighbors who were not too close or too numerous.

Unfortunately, the opinion does not reveal the exact extent of the black
population in the various "integrated" neighborhoods.

Apparently it did not

occur to the court that a prejudiced customer or a steering broker might regard
a neighborhood with, say, a 10% black population much differently than a
neighborhood that was 60% black.
285. See id. at 1331.
286. See notes 238-40 and accompanying text supra.
287. Id., citing Acevedo v. Nassau County, 369 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
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be proved solely by the testimony of testers." 288 The court's implicit rationale is that a broker's steering practices can have no
effect on a tester's choice of housing because a tester does not buy. 28 9
The Dwayne Realty opinion also indicates that even if the
plaintiff in a Title VIII steering case produces evidence, procured
by testers or otherwise, that might give rise to an inference that
the broker had acted with a discriminatory purpose, the broker
will likely be able to rebut that inference with ease. The court
noted that the broker therein produced as a witness one of its white
customers, who had been shown a number of homes in both integrated and all-white neighborhoods, and who eventually purchased
a home in an integrated area. 29 0 This customer's testimony established that he was on good social terms with his black next door
neighbors, and that the salesperson who dealt with him never
mentioned race. 2 1 Incredibly, the court declared that the testimony
of this single witness produced the "telling evidence that disposes
of this dispute" and "destroyed the entire claim of the plaintiffs." 292
These extreme statements make sense only if the court believed
that the broker who intends to steer is inevitably successful. 293
The Saroff, Welles-Bowen, and Dwayne Realty decisions thus
appear to suggest that racial steering by real estate brokers violates
Title VIII only if such action is tantamount to a refusal to deal
288. 482 F. Supp. at 1331. One commentator on racial steering has recognized that this argument may have validity if the broker's conduct is evaluated
under § 804(a). See Comment, supra note 206, at 814 n.27. But the commentator argues that testers should have no problem if their claims are
evaluated under § 804(b). Id. at 821 n.48.
289. The Dwayne Realty court's declaration that tester evidence cannot
establish that a broker's practices have a steering effect is in distinct contrast
to the approach taken in Real Estate One, in which the steering effect of the
broker's advertising and office-assignment practices was in essence presumed.
See notes 247-57 and accompanying text supra. Unfortunately, from the
point of view of the potential plaintiff, evidence of the experiences of actual
customers, the only readily apparent alternative to tester evidence of effect, is,
as a practical matter, no alternative at all. Collection of the relevant data
would not only be expensive and time-consuming, but would likely be unreliable due to variables other than the customer's race, such as the customer's
income or individual preferences, that might themselves plausibly account for
the revealed pattern of housing choice.
at 70-73.

See Bogen & Falcon, supra note 158,

290. See 482 F. Supp. at 1334-35.
291. Id. at 1334.
292. Id.
293. The broker in Dwayne Realty also showed that he had sold homes in
predominantly white neighborhoods to black and Asian customers, but had
never sold a home to a black in the neighborhood of heaviest black concentration. Id. at 1334.
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with customers who seek homes in "racially inappropriate" areas.294
Indeed, these decisions virtually amount to a judicial approval of
all but the most blatant and outrageous steering practices. Unless
Congress amends subsections (a) and (b) of section 804 of Title
VIII, or unless the courts that decide future steering cases return
to the more liberal approach reflected in Zuch and Real Estate One,
racial steering's current position as "the single most widely practiced form of racial discrimination in the [housing] sales market" 295
is unlikely to be jeopardized.
V.

CONCLUSION

One can reach three basic conclusions regarding Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968. First, Congress did not take the
initiative in passing a national statute to fight housing discrimination.296 Rather, it was President Johnson who was responsible for

finally getting Congress on track toward this essential goal. 297

Second, because of the inadequacies of Title VIII, and the resulting inability of the executive branch to enforce fair housing, 298 the

law has fallen far short of meeting its stated goal of insuring equal
housing opportunity throughout the United States. 299 Title VIII
therefore has been an "empty promise," a "law without teeth," and
a "paper tiger." 300 Third, the federal courts have only rarely gone
beyond the literal language of Title VIII in combatting blockbusting 301 and racial steering.

02

294. It is likely that the courts' reluctance to find that subtle steering
practices violate Title VIII stems in part from their focus on § 804(a) in
evaluating broker conduct. In the future, it is submitted that they should
consider the argument of one commentator, who opines that § 804(b) provides
a much broader ban on steering and reaches any broker conduct that involves
disparate treatment of black and white customers who are otherwise similarly
situated. See Comment, supra note 206, at 818-21. This commentator clearly
envisions that testers provide the most evidence of disparate treatment, and
that no showing of broker intent to discriminate should be required. Id. at
821 n.48. HUD's failure to promulgate substantive regulations that deal with
racial steering has undoubtedly contributed to the chilly reception that the
courts have given to steering complaints.
295. See note 162 supra.
296. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
297. See notes 33-55 and accompanying text supra.
298. See Lamb, supra note 9, at 405-29.
299. See notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
300. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 4, 21, 23.
301. For a discussion of the judicial constructions of the anti-blockbusting
provisions of Title VIII, see notes 172-204 and accompanying text supra.
302. For a discussion of the judicial constructions of the anti-steering provisions of Title VIII, see notes 205-95 and accompanying text supra.
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If the liberal faith in the efficacy of federal governmental
action to alleviate racial problems is still valid-and it is the opinion
of this author that it is-the Fair Housing Act must be amended
by Congress to give the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the Department of Justice far greater enforcement powers,80 3 and the federal courts must interpret the law more
broadly. Only then will this nation make meaningful progress
toward the goal of achieving equal housing opportunity.
303. For a discussion of the enforcement provisions of Title VIII, see
notes 111-25 and accompanying text supra.
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